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RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS
First, the final rites administered to the estoppel doctrine will allow more
patent attacks. Second, excusing post-patent royalties if attacks are
successful will provide licensees additional incentive to litigate. Finally, the
decision portends a probable loss of royalties for the pre-patent period
as well. Apparently, the Supreme Court's past benevolent attitude toward
the patent system has given way to a disposition of bare tolerance; no
doubt, additional incursions into patentees' privileges will be made. The
ultimate result will depend upon the extent to which the patent system
and conflicting policies, such as those of the antitrust laws, can peace-
fully coexist.
JAMES E. CLINE
Poverty Law-Unconstitutionality of Residence Requirements for
Welfare Assistance
The United States Supreme Court in Shapira v. Thompson1 recently
held that one-year waiting period requirements as a condition precedent
to receiving public assistance violate the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment by discriminating between two classes of citi-
zens on the basis of residence.' In three separate cases' district courts,
holding the residence requirements unconstitutional, had found that the
appellees, the applicants rejected for public assistance, were eligible for
benefits in every respect except for the requirement of residence for a
full year prior to application. The Supreme Court agreed with the lower
courts that the interests promoted by the classification and asserted by
the appellants were either interests that cannot be constitutionally pro-
moted by government or that are not "compelling" state interests.4
The appellants' primary justification for the waiting periods was pro-
tection of the budgetary integrity of state public assistance programs.
They defended the residence provisions on the fiscal grounds that people
who require welfare assistance during their first year of residence in a
1394 U.S. 618 (1969).
Id. at 638-42.
' On certiorari the Court consolidated Harrell v. Tobriner, 279 F. Supp. 22(D.D.C. 1967) ; Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1967) ; and Thomp-
son v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967). The inclusion of the case from
the District of Columbia was based on Boiling v. Sharpe, 374 U.S. 497 (1954),
in which the Court held that the fifth amendment's due process clause incorporated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 394 U.S. at 641-42. See
also Green v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967),
which was not appealed.
'394 U.S. at 627.
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state are likely to become continuing burdens on state welfare programs,
that migration of indigents who would enter the state solely to obtain
larger benefits would be discouraged by residence requirements, and that
an attempt to distinguish between new and old residents on the basis of
their contributions to the community through tax payments should be
permitted. Administrative and related governmental objectives allegedly
served by the waiting periods were (1) facilitating the planning of the
welfare budget; (2) providing an objective test of residence; (3) mini-
mizing the opportunity for applicants' fraudulent receipt of payments
from more than one jurisdiction; and (4) encouragement of early entry
into the labor force. These justifications were dismissed by the Court
as either without basis in fact or impermissible because less drastic means
are available to obtain the same objectives.' Indeed, the Court found
"weighty evidence that exclusion from the jurisdiction of the poor who
need or may need relief was the specific objective of these provisions. '"
There are two separate tests that the Court uses to determine whether
a state classification violates the equal protection clause; the nature of the
rights that the classification allegedly infringes determines which of the
two is applied.7 If the rights affected are "fundamental," the classifica-
tion can only be sustained if it is justified by compelling state interests. s
On other hand, the traditional attitude is to uphold state classifications
affecting nonfundamental rights unless the Court finds that the classifica-
tions are arbitrary.
Waiting-period requirements create two classes of needy resident fami-
lies indistinguishable from each other except that one is composed of resi-
dents of a year or more and the other of residents of less than a year in
the jurisdiction. The majority in Shapiro held that this distinction in-
fringed upon the fundamental right of interstate travel and thus that only
compelling state interests could justify the classifications.10 After the
'Id. at 627-38.
'Id. at 628. The Court found that residence requirements date from Eliza-
bethan Poor Laws, which were based on the concept that each local community
should care for its own indigents. Id. at 628 n.7.
" Id. at 660-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting).8 Apparently, the requirement that a classification based upon a "suspect"
criterion must be supported by a state's compelling interest arose in Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). That case involved racial classifications, which
have since been regarded as inherently "suspect." See Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967). In Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), the
Court by invalidating property requirements for voting added "wealth" to the list
of those which are suspect; in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23. (1968), the cri-
terion of political allegiance may have been added.
'E.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
10 394 U.S. at 634.
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Court concluded that the appellants neither used nor needed the one-year
waiting period for the suggested governmental purposes, it stated that
the residence requirement did not even meet the traditional equal protec-
tion test of whether a state classification is rational. Justice Harlan in
dissent disagreed with this evaluation of the right to travel and argued
that the less-rigid test of an absence of arbitrariness was appropriate."
In recent years the equal protection clause has been expanded to in-
validate many state limitations upon certain classes of citizenry, especially
those limitations affecting fundamental rights. The Supreme Court in
Kramer v. Union Free School District' overturned a New York voting
requirement providing that residents who were otherwise able to vote in
state and federal elections were eligible to vote in school district elections
only if (1) they owned or leased taxable real property within the district
or (2) were parents of children enrolled in the public schools. Even as-
suming that New York may legitimately limit the franchise in school dis-
trict elections to those primarily interested in school affairs, this particular
requirement is invalid because it does not accomplish this purpose with
sufficient precision to justify denying any qualified voter his franchise.
In the broader field of public welfare, the Court invalidated a Louisi-
ana wrongful death statute denying benefits to illegitimate children.'"
The Court based its decision on the traditional equal protection test and
found invidious the denial of the same claim for relief to illegitimate
children as allowed legitimate children.' 4 A ceiling upon grants to wel-
fare recipients regardless of the size of their families has been held by
several district courts to violate the equal protection test of arbitrariness.'5
Discrimination against families with many children cannot be justified
solely by the state interest of saving money. Although a state has a valid
interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its programs, "[t]he saving
of welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise invidious classification."' 6
In Shapiro the waiting periods affected the right of interstate move-
ment; the majority opinion categorized this right to travel with the pre-
ferred, fundamental freedoms of the first amendment. The right to
" Id. at 661-62 (dissenting opinion).
'-'395 U.S. 621 (1969).
"- Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
" Id. at 72. The Court said that "llegitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no
relation to the nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother." Id.5 Westberry v. Fisher, 297 F. Supp. 1109 (S.D. Me. 1969) ; Dews v. Henry,
297 F. Supp. 587 (D. Ariz. 1969); Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450
(D. Md. 1968). The Court recently granted certiorari to hear cases involving
maximum family grants. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1969, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
" Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969).
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interstate travel free from state restrictions, prior to the implementation
of the fourteenth amendment, had been recognized in Crandall v. Nevada.'
The Supreme Court in Crandall forbade the state of Nevada from levying
a tax upon commercial vehicles as they passed through the state. Al-
though the Court expressly refused to rely on the commerce clause, it
nevertheless held the tax invalid as an interference with vital govern-
mental functions because, among other things, it denied citizens free ac-
cess to governmental centers. 8 In Edwards v. California'0 the Court
invalidated a statute making it a misdemeanor for any person knowingly
to aid in transporting an indigent into California. A majority found that
the statute imposed an unconstitutional state burden on interstate com-
merce. The burden on commerce was immediate and absolute in Ed-
wards since indigents were excluded rather than deterred; the unconsti-
tutional action was solely that of the state.2" In Shapiro the majority held
that section 602(b) of the Social Security Act21 does not authorize state
residence requirements, but only permits the Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare to approve welfare grants to those states with no more
than one-year limitations. Even if the majority assumed congressional au-
thorization of waiting periods, the provisions insofar as they permit such
requirements would be violative of constitutional restrictions on state
action limiting freedom of interstate travel.22
Professor Chafee has proposed that "liberty" under the due process
clause includes the liberty of movement. 23 The Supreme Court, until
173 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
18 Id. at 43.
1- 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
"°In two concurring opinions four justices thought that the statute violated the
privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 177-86.
2-142 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1964). This section provides that:
The Secretary shall approve any [state assistance] plan which fulfills the
conditions specified in subsection (a) of this section, except that he shall
not approve any plan which imposes as a condition of eligibility for aid to
families with dependent children, a residence requirement which denies aid
with respect to any child residing in the State (1) who has resided in the
State for one year immediately preceding the application for such aid, or
(2) who was born within one year immediately preceding the application,
if the parent or other relative with whom the child is living has resided in
the State for one year immediately preceding the birth.
2 394 U.S. at 641. In Edwards, the Court relied on the commerce clause to
invalidate a state restraint on interstate travel. Id. The majority in Shapiro in-
validated congressional authorization of the District of Columbia's welfare re-
quirements even though the power to regulate commerce was granted solely to
Congress. Id. Thus, the commerce clause is obviously not the basis of the right
to travel discussed in Shapiro.
3 Z. CHAFEE, TiiRE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 192(1956).
[Vol. 48
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Shapiro, had applied this "liberty of movement" argument only to pro-
tect the right to travel abroad from infringement by the federal govern-
ment. Kent v. Dulles,24 which held that the Secretary of State was not
authorized to withhold a passport because the plaintiffs refused to sign
affidavits concerning their membership in the Communist Party, stated
by way of dictum, "[t] he right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which
the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law .... -2" Subse-
quent cases involving federal restrictions on travel have included similar
statements attributing the source of the right to travel to the due process
clause of the fifth amendment.26
Aptheker v. Secretary of State27 is the only ease prior to Shapiro in
which the Court invalidated a congressionally imposed restriction on
the right to travel. However, Aptheker involved a flat prohibition upon
certain travel and a claim that the congressional restriction compelled
choice between right to travel and the first amendment right to freedom
of association. 8
Whether the Supreme Court finally holds the commerce clause, the
due process clause, or the privileges and immunities clause of the four-
teenth amendment to be the constitutional source protecting freedom of
interstate travel, the ultimate concern is to what extent the state or fed-
eral government may impinge upon this right.29 For example, is not the
right to travel affected, if not chilled, by one state's offering higher welfare
benefits than another?
The decision in Shapiro leaves uncertain the validity of other state-
imposed waiting periods or residence requirements for determining
eligibilities to vote,30 to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt,
and to exercise other similar privileges and rights.31 Assuming a waiting
" 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
2r, Id. at 125.
"See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1965) (upholding a restriction
on travel to Cuba as not violative of due process.)
. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
'8 Cf. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
.' The Court in Shapiro did not justify the right to travel by the commerce
clause. Indeed, if it had, it could possibly have upheld the District of Columbia
residence requirements even though it invalidated those of the states. See note 22
mspra.
"' The Court recently avoided a direct decision on Colorado's six-month resi-
dence requirement for voting in national elections. The Court held the question
"moot" because of the occurrence of the election and the subsequent reduction of
the residency requirement from six months to two months. Hall v. Beals, 38
U.S.L.W. 4006 (U.S. Nov. 25, 1969).
" A California system for determining tuition at state colleges based on resi-
dency classification has recently been upheld as not arbitrary. See Kirk v. Board
of Regents, - Cal. App. 2d - , 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
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period for the applicant in each case, is there such a difference affecting
the right to travel between the denial of a license to practice a profession
and the denial of welfare benefits so that one classification is valid and
the other "invidious"? Is the right to vote, which the Constitution pro-
tects from certain forms of discrimination,"2 less fundamental than the
right to travel, which is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution?
So it would seem: The Supreme Court in Carrington v. Rash 3 recently
stated, "Texas has unquestioned power to impose reasonable residence
requirements on the availability of the ballot.")8 4
Residence requirements in welfare programs do not reflect the economic
need of an increasingly mobile work force. 8 Such requirements are op-
posed to democratic principles because they make second-class citizens of
Americans who follow the tradition of seeking a better life for them-
selves and their families. Of paramount importance, they are contrary to
the social philosophy recognized in this country for more than thirty
years. "The Social Security Act of 1935 embodied the philosophy that
every person in the country should have an access to an income sufficient
to meet the essential needs of life." 6
Although the disposal of welfare residence requirements may have
been demanded by the Constitution and socio-economic policies, the con-
sequences may not be entirely beneficial. It is possible that a few wel-
fare-minded states now will suffer a greater burden. 7 If these states are
compelled to limit their welfare programs or to enact proportionately
greater taxes, in the final analysis the overall welfare system may have
been deterred rather than promoted. On the other hand, the abolition of
residence requirements should encourage greater federal participation in
welfare programs."8 Federalizing the welfare system might eliminate the
present disparity between state welfare payments, spread the cost of wel-
" U.S. CoNsr. amend. XV & XIX.83380 U.S. 89 (1965).
"' Id. at 91. In Carrington the Court invalidated a provision in the Texas Con-
stitution that denied the right to vote to members of the armed forces who moved
their homes to Texas during their military duty and who remained in the service
while there.
"See Note, Welfare Benefits-A Constitutional Right to Change Residence?,
7 J. FAmILY L. 660, 665 (1968).
38 Note, Residence Requirements in State Public Welfare Statutes-I, 51 IowA
L.Rv. 1080, 1090 (1966).
" See Harvith, The Constitutionality of Residence Tests for General and Cate-
gorical Assistance Programs, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 567, 618 (1966).
88 Note, The Constitutionality of Welfare Residence Requirements, 22 Sw. L.J.
341, 349 (1968). For President Nixon's proposals outlining welfare reform, see
N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1969, § c, at 10.
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fare equally throughout the country, and possibly lead to more efficient
administration.3
Although Justice Harlan in Shapiro labeled the majority's holding an
unwise extension of the equal protection clause,4" it seems that if this
trend toward expansion continues, state classifications that deny a right
or privilege to one portion of its citizenry will be subject to closer scru-
tiny than in the past. There is no indication what classification the Court
will next regard as "inherently suspect."
GEORGE HACKNEY EATMAN
Torts-Extrinsic-Fact Test in the Law of Slander
The law of defamation has provoked many caustic comments from
legal writers. Sir Frederick Pollock notes that "no branch of the law
has been more fertile of litigation than this [defamation] ...nor has
any been more perplexed with minute and barren distinctions."1 Dean
Prosser calls defamation "a senseless thing, for which no court and no
writer has had a kind word for upwards of a century and a half. It has
been denounced many times in whatever scathing terms the vivid imagina-
tion of learned and literary authors could invent ...."2
The confusion that tends to invade this area of the law is apparent in
a recent North Carolina Court of Appeals case, Beane v. Weiman Co.3
In an action for slander by a former employee against her former employer,
her former employer's president, and two other company employees, the
plaintiff alleged that a company official had been informed by the two
other employees that plaintiff had called their wives and reported that
they were consorting with other women. The official told plaintiff that
one of the other employees was essential to the company and that he
had no choice but to terminate plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff further
alleged that these words were spoken by the employee-defendants with
" One suggested approach calls for the use of a negative income tax. See
Tobin, Pechman, & Mieszkowski, Is a Negative Income Tax Practical?, 77 YALE
L 1 (1967).
L. 39 4 U.S. at 659 (dissenting opinion).
F. POLLOCx, THE LAw op TORTS 237 (12th ed. 1923).
-'Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. Rnv. 839 (1960). In a lighter vein
A. P. Herbert noted that "the law of libel is almost incomprehensible, except to
those who have studied it from their cradles, and even for them it is a labyrinth
of uncertainties, of false clues, blind alleys, and unexplored passages." A. P. HER-
BERT, UcooxO LAw 129 (1936).
5 N.C. App. 276, 168 S.E.2d 236 (1969).
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